United Nations A/63/873

General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 104 (c)
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections: Election of eighteen members of the Human Rights Council

Note verbale dated 20 April 2009 from the Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat

The Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat and, in accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 60/251, has the honour to transmit the voluntary pledges and commitments to human rights made by the Kyrgyz Republic, a candidate for the 12 May 2009 elections to the Human Rights Council for the period 2009-2012 (see annex).

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Annex to the note verbale dated 20 April 2009 from the Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat

[Original: Russian]

The voluntary human rights commitments of the Kyrgyz Republic

The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, which attaches particular importance to strengthening and promoting human rights protection, has decided to put forward its candidacy for membership in the Human Rights Council for the term 2009-2012 in the elections to be held during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly in 2009 in New York.

The Kyrgyz Republic, as the sole candidate from the Central Asian region, aspires to one of the five vacant seats in the Asian regional group of the Human Rights Council.

Ever since it became independent, the Kyrgyz Republic has demonstrated its commitment to the idea of the universality of human rights as well as its dedication to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Kyrgyzstan is party to over 30 of the basic human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Our country makes timely submissions to the relevant human rights treaty bodies of periodic reports on its fulfilment of the provisions of the treaties mentioned.

In announcing its candidacy, the Kyrgyz Republic fully affirms its commitments to the advancement and protection of human rights nationally and internationally. At the national level, Kyrgyzstan will preserve the primacy of law and democracy, good governance and development as key principles in the advancement of human rights. The Kyrgyz Republic will also reinforce various national institutions that guarantee these rights and will continue its full support of their activities, including that of the Office of the Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan.

Furthermore, as party to all the basic international human rights treaties, Kyrgyzstan firmly believes that genuine strengthening of the rule of law is the best guarantee of the sustainable development of individuals and groups.

At the international level, Kyrgyzstan is actively involved in the United Nations human rights procedures. The Kyrgyz Republic fully supports and actively cooperates with various international organizations in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms. As the sponsor and supporter of various human rights resolutions, Kyrgyzstan emphasizes its commitments under the relevant special procedures. The Kyrgyz Republic will continue to support the various United Nations mechanisms promoting and protecting human rights as universal human values, including through the Human Rights Council, which is the most important United Nations specialized body for human rights, open dialogue and cooperation among peoples. The Kyrgyz Republic is in favour of impartial, objective and non-selective activities by this United Nations body, based on constructive dialogue and cooperation.

Widely acknowledged as a crossroads of various civilizations and cultures, Kyrgyzstan has shown itself to be a defender of peace, tolerance and mutual understanding among peoples. Adhering to the fundamental principles of its historic identity, Kyrgyzstan continues to make every effort to promote intercultural and interdenominational dialogue.

The Kyrgyz Republic attaches great significance to elections to the Human Rights Council. We firmly intend to expand the range of our relevant commitments in this area. Given what nas been stated above, we believe that the States Members of the United Nations will support the candidacy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the elections to the Human Rights Council for the term 2009-2012.

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General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 157
Financing of activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)

Financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009 (A/63/867). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification.

2. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Security Council, by its resolution 1863 (2009), expressed its intent to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Council by 1 June 2009. The Council requested the Secretary-General, in order for the AMISOM forces to be incorporated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation, to provide a United Nations logistical support package to AMISOM, including equipment and services, but not including transfer of funds to AMISOM, until 1 June 2009 or until a decision was taken by the Council, whichever was earlier.

3. The Advisory Committee further recalls that, in order to respond to the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, in a report dated 12 March 2009 (A/63/758) submitted a request, pursuant to section IV, paragraph 2, of General Assembly resolution 49/233 A, for commitment authority, with assessment, for the period from 1 May 2007 to 30 June 2009 in the amount of $80,906,900. By its resolution 63/275, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the support of AMISOM for the period from 1 May 2007 to 30 June 2009 in a total amount not exceeding $77,790,900 and decided to apportion that amount among Member States.

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4. Subsequently, by its resolution 1872 (2009), the Security Council authorized the member States of the African Union to maintain AMISOM until 31 January 2010 to carry out its existing mandate. The Council requested the Secretary-General to implement the incremental approach to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia set out in paragraphs 82 to 86 of his report of 16 April 2009 (S/2009/210), whereby the United Nations would continue to provide support to AMISOM and to build the capacity of the Somali institutions, while continuing to plan for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time.

5. In paragraph 17 of its resolution 1872 (2009), the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package to AMISOM, comprising equipment and services but not including transfer of funds to AMISOM, until 31 January 2010. In paragraph 19 of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM through the existing United Nations planning team in Addis Ababa.

6. Accordingly, in order to provide AMISOM with continued logistical support comprising equipment and services, and pending submission to the General Assembly of the proposed budget for the support of AMISOM for the 2009/10 period, the Secretary-General is requesting, pursuant to section IV, paragraph 2, of Assembly resolution 49/233 A, commitment authority, with assessment, for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009 in the amount of $185,673,700.

7. In paragraph 14 of his report contained in document A/63/867, the Secretary-General indicates that the projected requirements of $38,524,600 for military and police personnel reflect, inter alia, provision for daily rations for the anticipated average force strength of 6,283 troops for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009, allowing for a 20 per cent delayed deployment factor. The Advisory Committee was informed that, to date, there were currently five battalions on the ground in Mogadishu, for a total of around 4,300 troops. In addition, one further battalion from Burundi was ready for deployment and a firm pledge of one battalion had been received from Sierra Leone. However, it was envisaged that it would be at least three months before the latter battalion could deploy.

8. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that "life-support" requirements were currently being provided to AMISOM by a Member State under a letter-of-assist arrangement. However, it was anticipated that the United Nations own arrangements for support to AMISOM, including rations, fuel and water, would be in place by August 2009, and funding requirements had been calculated based on estimated prices similar to those in comparable United Nations peacekeeping operations. The required procurement action was being conducted in accordance with United Nations procedures, with a view to establishing a number of separate supply arrangements to replace the current multifunctional provider.

9. In paragraph 15 of his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the projected requirements of $13,170,000 for civilian staff reflect requirements for the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and for the New York and Addis Ababa planning teams, as well as for a four-member resident audit team to be embedded in UNSOA. The resource requirements for UNSOA cover staff salaries, staff assessment and common staff costs for 115 international and 110 national staff to be located at the main office in Nairobi and at the logistics and transit base in

Mombasa, Kenya (see para. 15 below). The estimate reflects the phased deployment of the proposed staff for the period 1 July to 31 December 2009, with the application of 30 and 20 per cent delayed recruitment factors to international and national staff, respectively.

10. The Secretary-General further states, in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his report, that the Security Council in its resolution 1872 (2009) also calls on the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union on the planning and deployment of AMISOM. Therefore, the cost estimates for civilian staff also reflect requirements for 34 positions for the Addis Ababa and New York planning teams. The overall number of dedicated planners providing support to the African Union in Addis Ababa has been reduced from 19 to 14 international staff. The number of national staff (four) will remain unchanged. Planning and coordination efforts in New York will also continue and the number of staff will remain the same as in the 2008/09 period (16 staff members). The Secretary-General proposes, however, that the existing Somalia Planning and Coordination Team in support of a future United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia be restructured and that a small team from within the previous staffing levels be formed to provide a dedicated integrated operational support capacity for UNSOA at United Nations Headquarters. The UNSOA Support Team will consist of five staff and the Somalia Planning and Coordination Team will consist of 11 staff.

11. The Advisory Committee notes the significant increase in the number of national positions proposed (115 as compared with 55 for the previous period). The Committee recalls that the estimates for the previous period provided for a total of 204 staff for UNSOA in Nairobi, with a small presence in Addis Ababa and Entebbe, Uganda (see A/63/780, para. 16). Upon enquiry, however, the Committee was informed that UNSOA currently had no presence in Addis Ababa or Entebbe and no longer intended to establish any staff in either location. The related positions included in the previous request for commitment authority had therefore been removed from the present proposal.

12. The Advisory Committee was further informed that UNSOA currently had 11 staff members on board (10 in Nairobi and one in Mombasa), 8 staff members on travel status and 6 staff members under recruitment. UNSOA had established a small recruitment cell in Nairobi to expedite the recruitment of civilian staff, and expected that between 35 and 40 staff members would be recruited each month.

13. In paragraphs 16 to 19 of his report (A/63/867), the Secretary-General indicates that the estimated operational requirements in the amount of $133,979,100 are attributable mainly to facilities and infrastructure ($88,013,900), ground transportation ($6,339,800), air transportation ($8,125,800), communications ($8,859,800), information technology ($5,552,700) and other supplies, services and equipment ($11,285,000).

14. According to the Secretary-General, the cost estimate for facilities and infrastructure includes requirements for the first six months of a two-year construction programme to build United Nations standard facilities, in compliance with minimum operating security standards, for military contingents in nine locations in Mogadishu, as well as the logistics and transit base in Mombasa. The Advisory Committee was informed that field visits to identify sites in Mogadishu for all nine camps had yet to be conducted. The estimate also includes requirements for the completion of the construction of the force headquarters and the level II

medical facility, for which partial provision was made during the 2008/09 period. A delayed implementation factor of 30 per cent has been incorporated into the resource requirements for the construction programme.

15. As the Secretary-General indicates in paragraph 8 of his report, the above-mentioned logistics and transit base in Mombasa is being established to manage the preparation and transfer of supplies, equipment and personnel to Mogadishu. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that Mombasa, rather than Entebbe, had been selected as the location of the base because significant savings would be realized under operational costs as a result of (a) the use of sea freight between Mombasa and Mogadishu rather than air transportation from Entebbe; (b) the non-requirement for the inland transportation of cargo from Mombasa to Entebbe; and (c) a lower number of flight hours for air freight on account of the shorter travel distance from Mombasa to Mogadishu (900 km as compared with 1,400 km from Entebbe).

16. The Secretary-General further indicates, in paragraph 3 of his report, that since airlift to Mogadishu airport is both expensive and vulnerable to attack, the emphasis will shift towards bulk sea movement for consignments. In that connection, representatives of the Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee that UNSOA had entered into an arrangement with Operation Atalanta, a European Union military mission established on 8 December 2008 to contribute to the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Under the terms of that arrangement, every AMISOM and United Nations ship is to be provided with a military escort from Mombasa to Mogadishu and back to Mombasa. The Committee was also informed that negotiations were under way with the World Food Programme on collaboration in the area of sea transport. **The Advisory Committee expects that detailed information about these arrangements will be provided in the context of a future budget submission.**

17. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the budget submission referred to in paragraph 19 below will reflect greater functional clarity in the various administrative structures referred to in the Secretary-General's report, which seem overly complex. The Committee further trusts that the Secretary-General will submit a proposal that provides for greater consolidation of UNSOA duty stations, as well as a clearer description of the respective roles and responsibilities of UNSOA and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia.**

18. The Advisory Committee notes that the planning assumptions for UNSOA have been refined in the three months since the Secretary-General's previous request for commitment authority. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General's report does not respond fully to a number of the comments and observations made by the Advisory Committee in its previous report (A/63/780). **Accordingly, the Advisory Committee reiterates those comments and observations and expects that they will be fully addressed in a future budget submission.**

19. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, the present request for commitment authority has been made pending submission to the General Assembly of the proposed budget for the support of AMISOM for the 2009/10 period. **The Advisory Committee expects that the proposed budget for the 2009/10 period, including a detailed description of actual expenditures incurred for the 2008/09 period, will be prepared as a matter of priority and submitted to the Assembly for action early in the main part of its sixty-fourth session.**

20. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in paragraph 20 of the Secretary-General's report (A/63/867). **Bearing in mind its comments and observations in the preceding paragraphs, as well as the previous decision of the Assembly to authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the support of AMISOM (see Assembly resolution 63/275), and working on the assumption that a full budget will be presented to the Assembly for action early in the main part of its sixty-fourth session, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Assembly authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009 in the amount of $124,000,000. The Committee also recommends that the Assembly approve assessment of that amount for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009. The Advisory Committee stresses, however, that its recommendation on commitment authority in no way prejudges the position that the Committee may take on the structure, number and level of posts or on other resources intended for the provision of support for AMISOM or a future United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia.**

United Nations A/63/875–S/2009/291

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General Assembly
Sixty-third session
Agenda item 21
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Letter dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention yet another incident of violation of Cyprus's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its air and maritime space, by Turkey.

On 27 May 2009, while the Cypriot-flagged vessel *EDT ARES* was carrying out maintenance on an installation for the collection of meteorological information off the south-west coast of Cyprus, upon request of the competent authorities of the Government of Cyprus, it was approached by the Turkish corvette *BEYKOZ F/503* asking to be informed of the work that it was performing. It was harassed by the same corvette for a number of hours before the latter eventually departed.

On 28 May 2009, a Turkish fighter jet (CN-235) flew to the above area, in violation of Cypriot airspace, and issued radio warnings to *EDT ARES* to withdraw "as it was in Turkish territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Turkey". *EDT ARES* explained that it had been mandated to carry out maintenance work by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and that it would remain in the area until its work was completed but the Turkish jet continued to issue warnings to the said vessel to withdraw.

These actions create unnecessary confrontation and tension, which is in fact the intended purpose on the part of Turkey in order to intimidate the Republic of Cyprus and obstruct it from carrying out any activity in its exclusive economic zone, especially as regards the exploration and exploitation of its sovereign natural resources.

The Republic of Cyprus stands ready to continue the process of delimitation of its exclusive economic zone with all its neighbouring States, pursuant to and on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Government of Cyprus has no doubts about its sovereignty over the totality of its territory, its territorial sea and its airspace and/or about its sovereign rights over its exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf.

I would be grateful if the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Minas A. **Hadjimichael**

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United Nations A/63/876–S/2009/293

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-third session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table of the violations committed by Israel by air, sea and land during the month of May 2009 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statistical table showing Israeli violations during May 2009

Air violations					*Land violations*					
Military jet	*Reconnaissance*	*Helicopter*	*Total*	*Sea violations*	*Military acts of aggression*	*Field violations*	*Breaches*	*Total*	*Overall total*	*Previous month's violations*
				Crossing of territorial waters, and firing of automatic-weapons rounds, flares and flare shells over territorial waters	Air raids, artillery shelling, shelling of military positions and important posts, attacks on and killing of civilians	Gunfire, launching of flare shells, dropping of artillery shells, infiltration and crossing of international borders	Threats and display of weapons, bulldozing of soil, placing of barbed wire and setting up of installations inside Lebanese territory			
10	19	—	29	7	—	7	1	8	44	43

United Nations A/63/877–S/2009/292

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Identical letters dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed from 15 to 31 May 2009 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities from 15 to 31 May 2009

Air violations

On 17 May 2009:

- Between 1030 and 1100 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;
- Between 1145 and 1835 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Zahle before leaving over Naqurah.

On 22 May 2009, between 0755 and 2000 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving over Naqurah.

On 23 May 2009, between 0745 and 2015 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the western Bekaa and the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 24 May 2009, at 0745 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South and the Bekaa, proceeding as far as Baalbek and Riyaq. It left over Rumaysh at 0110 hours on 25 May 2009.

On 25 May 2009, between 0705 and 1320 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving over Rumaysh.

On 26 May 2009, between 0737 and 1400 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over eastern Sidon, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving over Rumaysh.

On 27 May 2009:

- Between 1008 and 1108 hours, two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh and heading north. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;
- Between 1040 and 1140 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and heading north. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 28 May 2009, twelve Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace as follows:

- At 1010 hours, four warplanes entered over Alma al-Sha'b, while another four entered over Naqurah, heading north;

– At 1015 hours, two warplanes entered from over the sea off Batrun, heading east;

– At 1020 hours, two warplanes entered from over the sea off Juniyah, heading east.

They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1055 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

On 29 May 2009:

– Between 1917 and 2135 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering from over the sea off Beirut. It circled over the sea opposite Beirut, some six miles off the coast, before leaving over the sea off Naqurah;

– At 1355 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the western Bekaa before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0100 hours on 30 May 2009.

On 30 May 2009, between 0955 and 2210 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 31 May 2009, at 0750 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north. It circled over the South and the western Bekaa before leaving over Naqurah at 0530 hours on 1 June 2009.

Sea violations

On 19 May 2009:

– At 0125 hours, an Israeli enemy gunboat encroached 100 metres into Lebanese territorial waters for five minutes, between buoys Nos. 4 and 5. The enemy repeated the exercise at 0150 hours, at the same location and to the same distance;

– At 0140 hours, from its position at Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for three seconds towards buoy No. 3, some 300 metres inside Lebanese territorial waters.

On 22 May 2009, at 0150 hours, a Lebanese fishing vessel approached the line of buoys from the north, in the vicinity of buoy No. 3. The Israeli enemy, from its position at Ra's al-Naqurah, fired three bursts of medium-weapons fire towards the vessel, whereupon the vessel retreated to the north.

On 25 May 2009, at 0300 hours, an Israeli enemy gunboat directed a searchlight for 10 seconds towards buoy No. 3, its beam reaching some 300 metres inside Lebanese territorial waters.

On 26 May 2009, at 2142 hours, from its position at Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for seven seconds towards Lebanese territorial waters some 100 metres north of buoy No. 3 and over the Ra's al-Naqurah position.

Acts of aggression in the field

On 18 May 2009:

- At 2035 hours, from its position north of the Zar'it barracks, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles directed a searchlight for 10 seconds towards Jabal Balat (Marwahin);
- At 2140 hours, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for eight seconds from a wheeled vehicle located west of Khallat Wardah (opposite Ayta al-Sha'b) towards Jabal Balat (Marwahin).

On 25 May 2009, at 1340 hours, an Israeli enemy Hummer vehicle arrived at the enemy's position east of Khallat Wardah, opposite the Lebanese army position at Ruwaysat al-Hadab (Ayta al-Sha'b), and proceeded to point a 12.7 mm machine gun towards the Lebanese position. The vehicle was photographed by soldiers at the aforementioned position. The vehicle left at 1355 hours.

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 21
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Letter dated 5 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 7 April 2009 addressed to you, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded from 1 April to 28 May 2009, as follows:

On 1 April 2009, one C-160, two Cougar and one UH-1H Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 2 April 2009, one AB-205 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 3 April 2009, one Cougar and one UH-1H Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 6 April 2009, one CN-235 and one C-650 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 7 April 2009, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 8 April 2009, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 9 April 2009, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 10 April 2009, one C-650 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

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On 13 April 2009, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 14 April 2009, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 15 April 2009, one C-130 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 16 April 2009, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 20 April 2009, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 21 April 2009, one CN-235 and one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 22 April 2009, two CN-235 and one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 22 and 24 April 2009, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 24 and 25 April 2009, one B-200 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 30 April 2009, six F-16 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 1 May 2009, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 6 May 2009, one C-160 and one GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 7 May 2009, ten F-16 and eight F-4 Turkish military aircraft coming in two formations, violated international air traffic regulations twice.

On 8, 9 and 10 May 2009, one CN-235 and three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 11 May 2009, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 13 May 2009, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 14 May 2009, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 18 May 2009, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 20 May 2009, two F-16 and one C-130 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 24 May 2009, one CN-235 and one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 25 May 2009, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 26 May 2009, three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 27 May 2009, four F-16, one CN-235, one B-200 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 28 May 2009, one CN-235 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the aforementioned violations by Turkey and call for their immediate cessation.

Turkey's policy of non-observance of rules and regulations governing international aviation continues to gravely jeopardize flight safety and perpetuate insecurity and apprehension on the island. Furthermore, Turkey's persistent provocations, aimed at consolidating the de facto division of Cyprus and further strengthening the illegal secessionist entity in the occupied areas, seriously undermine all efforts towards reunification and reconciliation. Such policies and actions provide ample demonstration of the irresponsible behaviour of a country that now serves as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It was encouraging to see that in the recent report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus (S/2009/248), there was a reference to some of the aforementioned violations by Turkey.

The Government of Turkey should heed the call of the international community, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, thus contributing to the creation of the required conditions for the achievement of a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Minas A. **Hadjimichael**

United Nations A/63/879

General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 13
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Letter dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 2 June 2009 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, "Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development".

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

09-36552 (E) 110609

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Annex to the letter dated 4 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

As far as it is known, an agreement of cooperation was concluded between the Russian company Rosneft and the Sukhumi proxy regime envisaging the conduct of research and prospecting works over the gas and oil fields on the continental shelf of Abkhazia, Georgia, which represents a gross violation of the norms of international law as well as Georgian legislation, in particular:

- Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Georgia, as a coastal State, exercises sovereign rights and special jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying out economic activity, research works and exploitation of natural resources over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. These rights are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.

- Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia, adopted on 23 October 2008, which imposes restrictions on entrepreneurial activity on the occupied territories, including in the sea areas. Besides, the Code of Administrative Offences as well as the Criminal Code of Georgia provide for liability for the violation of national laws both on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone.

- In contrast to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, over which the coastal State (Georgia) exercises only sovereign rights for the purpose of their economic development, it should be emphasized that the territorial sea and internal waters make up the maritime area of Georgia over which Georgia exercises its full sovereignty. The only right that countries other than the coastal State may exercise within the territorial sea of the latter is that of innocent passage.

Therefore, the decision of the Russian Federation to conduct economic activity in the territorial sea and the internal waters of Georgia (across the section of Abkhazia) is a gross violation of international law and contradicts the fundamental principles of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Georgia, as a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, will employ all possible legal measures under the Convention to ensure a fair and peaceful settlement of the dispute in question and prevent illegal economic expansion from the side of the Russian Federation.

Tbilisi, 2 June 2009

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Sixty-third session
Agenda items 13 and 18

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 9 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to present for your attention the text of the statement by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe made on 5 June 2009 concerning the ongoing negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (see annex).

I would highly appreciate it if you could circulate the text of the statement as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13 and 18.

(*Signed*) Armen **Martirosyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

09-36577 (E) 150609

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Annex to the letter dated 9 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Saint Petersburg, 5 June 2009. The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group released the following statement today:

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Ambassador Yuri Merzlyakov, Russian Federation; Ambassador Bernard Fassier, France; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, United States) took part, with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrej Kasprzyk, in the meeting of the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and the President of Armenia, Serge Sargsyan, in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on 4 June 2009.

This meeting was the fifth since June 2008, when the Presidents met for the first time.

During their tête-à-tête conversation as well as at the working session held afterwards with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Presidents discussed the overall conception of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement advanced by the mediators and reviewed some of the elements of the proposed settlement that have not yet been agreed.

The conversation took place in a constructive atmosphere and resulted in positive steps that narrowed the differences between the two countries on a number of the basic principles of the settlement.

Because of these positive developments in their discussion, both Presidents asked the mediators to continue their shuttle diplomacy and to open a new and major subject outlined by the Madrid document, which, according to their views, still remains the basis of the negotiation.

In addition, the two Presidents agreed on the mediators' proposal for the Presidents to continue their meetings in the nearest future, if possible in July.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-third session
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Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict

Summary

In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to provide advice on how to support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing.

The present report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. Reflecting on past peacebuilding experience, section II underscores the imperative of national ownership as a central theme of the report and highlights the unique challenges arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development. If countries develop a vision and strategy that succeeds in addressing these objectives early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Section III identifies several recurring priorities that relate directly to these core objectives, and for which international assistance is frequently requested in the early days after conflict. Seizing the window of opportunity requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively to support these recurring priorities.

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Section IV describes efforts undertaken to date by the United Nations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict response, and identifies systemic challenges related to differing mandates, governance structures and financing arrangements across diverse United Nations entities, which prevent the Organization from making deeper reforms.

Section V sets out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations response in the immediate aftermath of conflict as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from the wider international community. The core elements of this agenda include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms.

Section VI considers the critical role of the Peacebuilding Commission in supporting post-conflict countries and proposes several suggestions for consideration by Member States as to how the Commission could strengthen its advisory role in relation to the early post-conflict period that is addressed in the report.

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the Peacebuilding Commission, international and regional organizations and Member States to consider how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. The Security Council also invited the Secretary-General to provide advice within 12 months to the relevant United Nations organs on how best to take forward these issues within the United Nations system and, taking into account the views of the Peacebuilding Commission, how to coordinate peacebuilding activities and encourage the mobilization and most effective use of resources for urgent peacebuilding needs. Accordingly, following consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission, I am submitting the present report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. When large-scale violence ends, the challenges facing the leadership and people of the country are enormous. The situation is fluid, the peace is often very fragile, and the needs of the people are far greater than the capacity to meet them. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

3. The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts. If countries succeed in these core areas early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict.

4. While building peace is primarily the responsibility of national actors, the international community can play a critical role. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Time and again, we have failed to catalyse a response that delivers immediate, tangible results on the ground. Often, it has taken many months before essential government functions resume or basic services are available. In some cases, it has taken several years before the international community has aligned its efforts behind a common strategic vision. Capacities and resources have been insufficient to meet urgent demands on the ground. Even though capacity is limited, we frequently struggle to focus scarce resources on a limited set of agreed results that can enhance confidence in and commitment to a peaceful future.

5. Within the international community, the United Nations has a critical and significant role to play in peacebuilding. At the same time, the United Nations system is only one of several actors working to support post-conflict countries, and the coherence of this broader international effort is key to helping countries to succeed in their efforts to construct a viable peace. Partnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding.

6. In the present report, I reflect on some of the lessons of peacebuilding and set out an agenda to strengthen the Organization's response as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from others. The core elements of this agenda

include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms. National authorities, the United Nations system and other international partners can have a much greater and earlier collective impact if we agree on an early strategy with defined and sequenced priorities, and align action and resources behind that strategy.

II. Context and the need for national ownership

7. While every post-conflict situation is unique, the United Nations has accumulated a broad range of experience, and we have learned many lessons from supporting dozens of countries emerging from conflict. First and foremost, we know that peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Only national actors can address their society's needs and goals in a sustainable way. The imperative of national ownership is a central theme of the present report, as are the unique challenges we encounter arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations.

8. Despite their diversity, the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. We have learned that continued fragility and considerable volatility often accompany evolving peace processes. Stability in one part of a country may coexist alongside continued violence in other parts. Humanitarian crises and continued violations of human rights may continue to unfold beyond the formal cessation of hostilities. The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace: a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist. There may also be increased tensions as people return to destroyed or occupied homes. Impunity for serious crimes and atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence, which may have occurred before, during and after the conflict can seriously jeopardize peacebuilding efforts during this early phase. Failure to restore State authority, particularly in remote border areas, may create new sources of threat or permit wartime practices of smuggling or illegal trade in natural resources to persist or even expand, undermining State revenue.

9. The end of conflict nevertheless tends to create high expectations for the delivery of concrete political, social and economic dividends. Building confidence in a peace process requires that at least some of these expectations are met. Equally important is effective communication and an inclusive dialogue between national authorities and the population, not least to create realistic expectations of what can be achieved in the short run.

10. There also needs to be a basic level of political will, commitment and consensus among the main national protagonists, without which most peacebuilding efforts will be futile. The extent to which a consensus can emerge depends heavily

on the conditions under which violence ceases, the quality of the peace agreement, and the nature of the peace process. Some peace processes are robust and inclusive and, as a result, have the support of a broad cross section of the population. As we saw in Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Namibia, peacebuilding efforts, while still complex to implement, benefited from a detailed agenda to address the causes of conflict. However, many peace processes are more fragile and require careful political reinforcement and determined efforts by international and national actors to hold the peace in the face of ongoing violence and opposition from spoilers. Some agreements even fail to establish minimum conditions for sustainable peace or an agenda for the resolution of conflict.

11. In some post-conflict countries, the capacity and will to exercise full national ownership may be constrained because the peace process is still ongoing and a stable political order is yet to be established. Many post-conflict countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until the first post-conflict elections are held. National authorities are often appointed rather than elected, put in place through a brokered agreement between parties to the conflict who may not be fully representative or recognized by the population. In addition, some of the national actors with whom the international community must engage may be implicated in past human rights abuses or significant atrocities.

12. International support in such complex and rapidly evolving situations is therefore a fundamentally political and often high-risk undertaking. Efforts that bolster the power of unrepresentative leaders, or empower one group at the expense of another, can exacerbate the causes of conflict or create new sources of tension. International actors need to be mindful of these considerations. Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country's future. The full participation of women in these processes is essential, both as victims of the conflict and as important drivers of recovery and development.

13. Beyond the domestic political circumstances, establishing the conditions for peacebuilding is also significantly influenced by regional and international actors. Given that many conflicts have cross-border dimensions, neighbouring States as well as regional and subregional organizations play a critical role and have commensurate responsibilities in supporting peacebuilding processes. Regional organizations have increasingly been at the forefront of peace processes, including in mediating and guaranteeing peace agreements, and monitoring their implementation.

14. The support of United Nations intergovernmental bodies, individual Member States and other international stakeholders has proven to be crucial in the immediate aftermath of conflict when counterproductive behaviour by even one major actor can be very damaging. The Security Council plays an essential role in signalling strong international attention and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorizing a number of potential steps, including new peacekeeping operations, special political missions, panels of experts and other measures.

III. Recurring peacebuilding priorities

15. We know that when large-scale violence ends, the needs of the people tend to be far greater than the capacity of national or international actors to meet them. Given this imbalance, national and international efforts in the early post-conflict period should focus on meeting the most urgent and important peacebuilding objectives: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.

16. The challenge is to identify which activities best serve these objectives in each unique context. As my report of 8 April 2009 on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189) outlines, peace agreements should provide an overall framework, but at times they set out an overly broad, ambitious and sometimes only preliminary agenda. Additionally, priority-setting must reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply. Our plans and actions also have to reflect a clear understanding of existing capacities on the ground, whether they are national, subnational or international (including those of the operational United Nations agencies, funds and programmes). Scaling up these capacities and operations, where relevant, can yield the fastest and most effective results in the initial months.

17. In addition, experience and analysis accumulated over the last two decades, as well as numerous interviews conducted with national and international practitioners for the preparation of the present report, point to several recurring areas where international assistance is frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict. There will always be additional country-specific priorities such as organized crime and natural resources management. However, seizing the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively in these areas, which relate directly to the core objectives mentioned above. They are:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels
- Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

18. Basic security and safety — whether provided by the State or with international assistance — are essential to the population and to create the needed

political space, and to enable the delivery of international assistance. Supporting the political process and reconstituting a stable and peaceful political order have to be central goals. The post-conflict government needs to build core State capacities that will help to restore its legitimacy and effectiveness, including the capacity to provide basic services and essential public safety, to strengthen the rule of law, and to protect and promote human rights. Visible peace dividends that are attributable to the national authorities, including early employment generation and supporting returnees, are also critical to build the confidence in the government and the peace process. Jump-starting economic recovery can be one of the greatest bolsters of security, and provides the engine for future recovery. These priority areas span across development, peace and security and human rights, reflecting the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature of these areas, as repeatedly emphasized by Member States, including in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

19. National capacity development across all these areas must start immediately. Too often, capacity development is seen in the context of international exit strategies from post-conflict countries. This is always too late. Inattention to capacity development constrains national actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between the State and its people. It must be a central element of all peacebuilding activities from the outset and be targeted particularly at strengthening national leadership to forge a clear vision with manageable priorities.

20. Getting the timing and sequencing right among priorities requires a delicate balance and difficult trade-offs within the framework of a coherent strategy. Early security provision, for example, may be essential to prevent relapse into conflict and to deter potential spoilers to a peace process. The establishment of livelihood opportunities and addressing housing, land and property issues often requires early emphasis because it helps to meet people's most immediate needs and thereby builds confidence in as well as a commitment to peace. Other priority activities, if pursued too early after conflict, can undermine a fragile peace. Electoral processes can contribute to more legitimate political authority but may also be a source of tension and renewed conflict if they are rushed and the political environment is not conducive to holding them, if inadequate attention is paid to technical constraints, and the need to strengthen and nurture nascent political processes, community participation and civil society is ignored. When military forces or the civil service should be restructured is also often a delicate issue. In the past, national and international actors have arguably moved too quickly in some areas while moving too slowly in others, upsetting the balance between building confidence and exacerbating tensions. In the first two years after conflict, one of the greatest strategic challenges is to ensure that actions or decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium- and long-term peacebuilding.

21. The needs of women and girls require more attention, as recovery efforts may prioritize the needs of men. The early post-conflict period offers a critical opportunity for women to capitalize on the changes in gender relations that may occur during conflict where women may have taken on community leadership roles or non-traditional employment. A tendency by outsiders to work with and acknowledge the leadership of men in governance and the economy, however, can mean that women's capacities to engage in public decision-making and economic recovery may not receive adequate recognition or financing. Women's marginalization can be exacerbated in contexts where sexual violence has been a

major feature of the conflict, eroding public safety and women's social standing. As Security Council noted in its resolution 1820 (2008), persistent violence, intimidation and discrimination are obstacles to women's participation and full involvement in post-conflict public life, which can have a serious negative impact on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including post-conflict peacebuilding.

22. Over the past two decades, we have learned that no single template can be applied to fluid and complex situations. Maintaining flexibility and adaptability are essential while at the same time respecting fundamental principles of international law and human rights is essential. This cannot come, however, at the expense of predictability and speed. At the very least, we need to be ready to provide support in these recurring priority areas. In the past, our response has been slow and piecemeal, reflecting inadequate organization, a resistance to prioritization and common assessment and planning approaches, a lack of capacity in several priority areas and considerable deployment delays in others, and insufficient financing delivered through poorly suited funding mechanisms. Our collective task is to resist the temptation to create new mechanisms unless they are absolutely necessary. Rather, we should build on our experience of what works, and strengthen our capacities to ensure a more predictable, coherent and targeted approach to supporting countries as they emerge from conflict.

IV. United Nations efforts to date and systemic challenges

23. Over the past several years, the United Nations has been working to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness through reform efforts in several areas, ranging from political, peacekeeping, security, human rights and humanitarian, to development activities. Among the common themes of these initiatives is their focus on better coherence and coordination, clarity on roles and responsibilities, coherent integrated strategies, stronger partnerships among key actors, and a move towards greater predictability and accountability. In the humanitarian sphere, progress has been achieved through pooled funds, increased coordination, capacity and accountability in specific sectors, and strengthened support to country-level leadership. In peacekeeping, partnership frameworks with regional and other organizations are being developed and deepened to enable us to engage more coherently and effectively in support of peace and security. Development and humanitarian actors have been working closely to ensure that as humanitarian assistance draws down over time, coordination arrangements, increased capacity, programmes and funds are in place to maintain and expand efforts to help countries to establish the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Yet, many of these efforts have encountered serious systemic obstacles. For example, voluntary and ad hoc funding arrangements have frustrated many attempts to create real predictability and accountability for results. Member States have supported little or no standing capacities for many priority areas.

24. Bringing to bear the full force of the United Nations system in support of a country emerging from conflict presents unique and significant challenges. The United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these "pillars". However, the United Nations entities with capacity in these fields were each designed for a different purpose. Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and

financing arrangements — and different cultures and notions of how things should be done. As practice has evolved, each part of the United Nations system has developed its own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace and accountability. In this context, our efforts to "deliver as one" in the field are vital but not sufficient. The fragmented nature of governance across the United Nations system heightens the need for Member States to carry a common position into the multiple United Nations organs dealing with peacebuilding-related issues, and to work closely with us to better configure the Organization for a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

25. A key mechanism to ensure greater coherence in this regard is the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission's establishment in 2005 reflects Member States' recognition of the need for a dedicated United Nations mechanism to sustain attention, mobilize resources and improve coherence while addressing critical gaps, needs and priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Through its unique membership and working modalities, the Commission has promoted an inclusive and integrated approach to peacebuilding in countries on its agenda. As the Commission approaches a five-year review in 2010, the experience it has gained to date in supporting Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic could contribute to strengthening the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and informing the evolving nature and scope of the Commission's advisory role.

V. Supporting a coherent and effective response: an agenda for action

26. I am strongly committed to an improved response by the United Nations in the early period after conflict, particularly by ensuring strengthened United Nations leadership and delivery capacity as well as greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability within the United Nations system. This will require stronger and better supported leadership teams that are empowered to set out an early strategy with clearly defined priorities, working with national counterparts, and to align action and resources behind that strategy. The present report sets out an agenda aimed at achieving these objectives.

27. The elements of this agenda are interconnected. Agreeing on priorities and forging a common strategic approach require effective and empowered leadership. But a coherent strategy is meaningless without the capacity and resources to implement and fund it. Aligning funding decisions behind agreed priorities can help to drive all actors in the same direction. The absence or weakness of one element can undermine all the others. But they can also be mutually reinforcing, thus increasing our ability to support national actors in their quest for sustainable peace.

28. This agenda builds on the systems that are on the ground before hostilities cease, improving or augmenting them as necessary. A United Nations country team is in place before, during and after a conflict, led by the Resident Coordinator, who often is also the Humanitarian Coordinator during and for some time after the conflict. Once conflict ends, the United Nations presence on the ground may be configured in different ways and its presence may evolve during the first two years,

including bringing in the capacity of non-resident agencies as appropriate. Regardless of its configuration, the United Nations and its partners typically have considerable country expertise and humanitarian capacities on the ground that will continue to provide life-saving support based on humanitarian principles in the early post-conflict period. Some of these capacities can also be transitioned towards early peacebuilding priorities, particularly through those entities that have a dual humanitarian and development mandate, such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization. These agencies also work with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Early Recovery Cluster/Network to initiate recovery at the earliest opportunity. This can help to jump-start the response, deliver early peace dividends and develop national capacities in key areas during the earliest phase, for example, by expanding essential services in health and education or rehabilitating essential infrastructure.

29. Also in this period, the Security Council may mandate the deployment of multidimensional peacekeeping operations or special political missions. Over the past decade, much of the focus and accumulated experience of the United Nations in supporting peacebuilding has been carried out in the context of integrated missions. Integrated missions emerged from a recognition of the interdependence of United Nations efforts at the country level and the need for greater coherence among these efforts, primarily through integration at the level of leadership and planning. This is particularly important with respect to peacebuilding activities where a coordinated engagement with and support to State structures and populations is often essential. More recently, we have started applying the principle of integration to a broader set of integrated United Nations presences in post-conflict countries, and we are developing new tools to strengthen the strategic partnership between United Nations missions and country teams, such as the integrated strategic framework. The main objective of these efforts is closely linked to the agenda set out in the present report, namely to maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations response. As we continue to move towards more effective integration, we will also need the support of Member States to ensure that United Nations rules and regulations allow for and facilitate collaboration among different United Nations entities at the country level.

Effective leadership, coordination and accountability

30. One of the core elements of the agenda set out in the present report is the need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground. This will not only enhance coherence and collective impact among United Nations entities but also facilitate a more coherent response from other international actors. As the Security Council has noted, there is often a need for the United Nations to play a leading role in the field in coordinating broader international efforts in post-conflict situations, especially in the earliest phase. Despite these expectations, the United Nations has encountered a number of serious obstacles that the present report intends to address.

31. The United Nations faces unprecedented demands on leadership capacity as the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping and political missions has expanded dramatically in recent years. The extreme nature and scope of the challenge requires a highly unique profile. In addition to the essential political negotiation and mediation expertise, in-depth regional knowledge and requisite

linguistic capabilities, mission leaders should ideally possess demonstrated experience in strategic planning and management of large, complex organizations. As it is unlikely that a single individual possesses all of the skills and competencies required, the solution must be found in the development and strengthening of well-integrated leadership teams that would bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the United Nations country presence, where relevant. Individual appointments must contribute to the overall balance of complementary skills and strengths within the leadership team.

32. With this in mind, the Organization is building on efforts to succession plan and to better articulate the requirements of senior positions across missions. It is reaching out to potential candidates, with a particular emphasis on women, and broadening communication with Governments, regional organizations and non-governmental entities, as well as strengthening partnerships throughout the United Nations system and with our key multilateral partners. These partners, in turn, are better able to understand the unique demands of the field and assist in growing the pool of potential candidates capable of assuming these demanding responsibilities.

33. Given the magnitude of the task, leadership teams need to be supported by analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of small, unified teams of experts that can be rapidly supplemented by additional pre-identified expertise. These teams provide the support to bring the various parts of the United Nations response together, including providing a dynamic link with the political process, and facilitate a common approach among national and international actors. At present, such capacities do exist but they are still well below the level and range of expertise necessary to support an effective and strategic response. Experts continue to be deployed piecemeal with different rules and procedures to support separate parts of the United Nations in-country presence. This complicates their ability to come together quickly and work together effectively. Support for the Resident Coordinator is particularly weak because as the support provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for humanitarian coordination winds down, it is replaced with considerably less capacity in the Resident Coordinator's office, just as the need for assessment, planning and coordination of recovery activities begins to increase.

34. However, there is presently no mechanism in place at Headquarters that looks at country-level leadership from a team perspective and ensures that the right leadership teams are in place and properly supported. Such increased leadership capacity and support is required in all peacebuilding contexts, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. ***I have therefore asked the lead departments at Headquarters to create a senior-level mechanism with other key entities at Headquarters that will ensure that the right leadership and support teams are in place as early as possible.*** This will include much more focused attention on how well our senior staff is functioning as a team. A greater degree of senior-level attention will help avoid the delays and piecemeal nature of most efforts to date, and accelerate and adapt existing mechanisms for identifying, recruiting and deploying leaders and support teams, as required, as well as troubleshooting where clear problems emerge. Ongoing efforts by relevant Secretariat departments and the Development Operations Coordination Office to strengthen the capacities they can make available to leaders in the field are being reinforced and accelerated. These capacities are funded either through the assessed budget or through extrabudgetary

resources. ***I urge Member States to make the necessary funding available through these existing mechanisms so that shared analysis, planning and coordination capacities can be strengthened.***

35. Strengthening country-level leadership also requires improving guidance and support from Headquarters so that field presences can draw on existing capacities in a more seamless and coherent fashion, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. At present, integrated task forces are convened by the lead department for all relevant conflict and post-conflict countries. They are meant to bring together all the relevant departments and agencies of the United Nations system at Headquarters to facilitate coherent support to the Organization's in-country presence. However, the quality of support provided by these Headquarters task forces to the field has been uneven and not sufficiently focused on strategic guidance and the needs on the ground. This issue is being taken up by my senior managers, who have initiated a review and will submit their recommendations later this year as to how to make these task forces more effective and responsive to the needs of the field.

36. There is also a need to review the core elements of coherent and predictable Headquarters support and guidance to the field more generally. This will include reviewing the provision of coherent Headquarters support and guidance to Resident Coordinators and United Nations country teams, building on the existing Resident Coordinator framework and mechanisms, particularly in situations of armed conflict, political crisis or rising political tension where there is no political mission or office. Based on this review, I will build expectations for Headquarters support into my compacts with the relevant Under-Secretaries-General and monitor progress. The resources for Headquarters support of United Nations country operations need to be able to increase and decrease according to the country's changing political and operational needs.

37. Strengthening senior leaders' authority to ensure a more coherent approach among the United Nations entities on the ground should be accompanied by more robust accountability mechanisms. I have introduced "senior managers' compacts" for all Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant-Secretaries-General at Headquarters, but no similar mechanisms exist for Special Representatives or other Heads of Mission. Therefore, ***I am taking steps to strengthen the accountability of my Special Representatives to reflect their substantial duties and responsibilities.***

38. The senior United Nations leadership in the field needs the authority to convene all United Nations actors to agree on priorities and the division of responsibilities, which should then be reflected in the Organization's integrated strategic framework. This framework could be used as a mechanism for mutual accountability between the senior representative and the members of the United Nations presence for delivering on agreed responsibilities. A system of mutual accountability would bolster the authority of the Organization's in-country leadership to ensure that United Nations entities deliver on agreed priorities in support of a common strategy, while allowing members of the United Nations team to provide valuable feedback on the leadership support they need. The "management and accountability system of the United Nations development and resident coordinator system" that was recently adopted by the United Nations Development Group could provide a model that should be explored further. ***I will explore with my senior managers the development of mutual accountability measures whereby my***

senior representative is both empowered and held accountable for his or her performance by the system and at the same time he or she can hold each part of the system accountable for implementing agreed roles and activities, consistent with their mandates, based on the integrated strategic framework.

Assessment, planning and strategy

39. The establishment of a coherent strategy in a fast-moving and uncertain post-conflict environment requires the support and cooperation of a diverse range of national and international actors. At present, efforts to foster such a strategy are frustrated by disunity among actors, fragmentation of assessment and planning tools and the lack of a framework for prioritization. Key stakeholders often pursue competing individual agendas based on unilateral political, economic, security and institutional interests and perspectives. Bilateral and multilateral agencies re-engaging in a country after conflict may set in motion multiple, separate and often competing programmes without a clear or coherent vision as to the needs and priorities of the country, or a link to the unfolding peace process. Within the United Nations, despite ongoing efforts to integrate planning for security, efforts aimed at political, humanitarian and development remain a serious challenge.

40. The capacities and tools at our disposal within the Organization vary depending on the United Nations presence on the ground immediately following conflict and how that presence evolves during the first two years. In cases with Security Council-mandated missions, the United Nations internal integrated mission planning process is focused on ensuring unity of purpose in-country through establishing a shared vision and agreed priorities. Although we have made substantial progress, the Organization still needs to improve its ability to agree on and deliver a critical set of priorities for early post-conflict environments. In this context, my decision that all United Nations integrated presences have a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic framework, represents an important step forward. The United Nations integrated strategic framework is meant to articulate a shared vision of the Organization's strategic objectives as well as a related set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. The integrated mission planning process, while focused on the coherence and coordination of United Nations strategies and operations, is also designed to align United Nations roles, capacity and scarce resources in specific country situations with national priorities and the roles of other international actors.

41. Effective peacebuilding also requires a level of international support that goes beyond that provided by the United Nations. Experience has shown that when the United Nations and the World Bank work closely together they can provide a valuable platform for a coherent approach between national and international actors. Over the last several years, the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, recently joined by the European Commission, have expanded their partnership in post-conflict environments. The focus has been on developing an in-country and nationally led common assessment and priority-setting methodology, known as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. This methodology seeks to situate local actors at the centre of the assessment process. It is focused on immediate and medium-term peacebuilding and recovery assistance needs and provides the basis for discussion with national actors, leading in time to the development of a national framework for peace consolidation and recovery, which can guide international and

national resource allocation. It is intended to be an iterative process, which can be initiated rapidly and successively expanded and detailed over time, with greater national involvement and ownership. The national framework for peace consolidation and recovery can then provide the basis for a compact that can be used by both national and international partners in monitoring progress against commitments. The Peacebuilding Commission could have an important role to play in monitoring progress against such compacts.

42. Over the last year, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology has been significantly revised to reflect political and security dimensions and to enable more effective engagement with political and security actors present on the ground. The revised methodology provides a framework for a more coherent and rationalized approach to aid coordination. ***I encourage Member States with significant in-country presence to join Post-Conflict Needs Assessment processes, as appropriate, and all Member States to align funding with the resulting outcome.***

43. The United Nations integrated mission planning process and the national peace consolidation and recovery framework derived through the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology follow different timelines and serve different purposes, but they need to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The senior United Nations leadership team has a responsibility to ensure the strategic coherence and appropriate linkages between the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the United Nations internal planning processes by maintaining an ongoing dialogue around a common vision with the key national, regional and international stakeholders.

44. Notwithstanding the important progress on integrated planning and common assessments, United Nations and non-United Nations actors on the ground are often slow to adapt to changing political circumstances when conflict ends and new missions take time to deploy and become operational. There is still too often a gap in terms of clear prioritization and new or revised plans for implementation in the early months, before a mission may be fully deployed or more extensive assessments have taken place in advance of a major donor conference. Efforts to fill this gap should be guided by the terms of the peace process, mandates provided by the Security Council, and existing planning and activities of the United Nations country team. Ongoing activities that are essential to the success of peacebuilding should also be included. ***My senior representatives on the ground will convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and develop an early strategy and action plan focusing on immediate national priorities, appropriate sequencing of priority initiatives, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for activities that have to be implemented or supported by the United Nations and funded right from the start, including through an early Peacebuilding Fund disbursement. Relevant World Bank activities should also be reflected.*** Where a mission is deployed or being planned, an early iteration of an integrated strategic framework should be used for this purpose. Doing so will help to bring all relevant actors around a common and limited set of priorities quickly, thereby also enabling bilateral and multilateral actors to align their early funding decisions behind a common strategy.

National capacity development

45. As discussed above, capacity development has to be considered from the outset and should be a central element of all peacebuilding efforts. Enhancing

leadership and aid coordination capacity is particularly important in the early days because it enables national leaders to drive their country's recovery and to better manage their relationship with international partners. Too often major international operations have failed to draw on the capacities that do exist. Such operations have also undermined opportunities for national capacity development by relying too heavily on international personnel to substitute in areas where capacity may be lacking, without paying adequate attention to capacity development needs in those areas.

46. The extent to which human and institutional capacities are depleted by conflict varies significantly from country to country. Too often the international community begins activities in a post-conflict country without first assessing what capacities exist. There is a tendency to assume that capacity has been completely depleted, rather than finding existing capacity and strengthening it. ***Post-conflict peacebuilding should begin with an assessment of existing capacities and needs in the typical priority areas at the national and subnational levels using agreed common assessment tools. The results of such assessments should then inform decisions on the design of support and the deployment of international resources and expertise.***

47. As part of the humanitarian response, the Early Recovery Cluster/Network provides an important foundation for later efforts by protecting and investing in people's livelihoods and developing the capacity of community leaders, civil society organizations and local government in pockets of peace, and assessing national capacity in key sectors and institutions, where possible. This can facilitate efforts to identify and mobilize existing national and local capacity once conflict ends. The Cluster also ensures that assistance adapts to the rapidly evolving political situation in the early days after conflict, including the need to transition international actors from providing services directly to populations, to supporting national actors to provide those services.

48. International organizations often recruit qualified national professionals away from local institutions and organizations through financial and other incentives. This undermines the need to strengthen national institutions and distorts the domestic economy. Early and sustained support to the civil service and local institutions is crucial to provide adequate compensation and conditions for professionals who remain within domestic structures where their contribution to peacebuilding and recovery may have greatest impact.

49. Using and supporting national capacity should be the first preference for international assistance. Representatives from the diaspora can also be an important resource of knowledge and expertise, although experience shows that mobilizing the diaspora is potentially a politically sensitive undertaking that must be carefully managed. If there is need for international expertise, regional experts would be most effective, given their language skills and knowledge of local conditions. The substitution of international capacity to perform critical peacebuilding tasks, even if only on a short-term and limited basis, must be approached cautiously and on the basis of demonstrable need. At a minimum, it must not undermine or replace existing national capacities and should be accompanied by efforts to develop the necessary capacity. ***Where the international community is requested to provide international technical capacity to support line-functions in national Governments, this must be accompanied by capacity development programmes.***

50. ***Building on existing structures and mechanisms in the field, the senior United Nations leadership team should ensure that there is sufficient dedicated expertise to promote and coordinate capacity development efforts, and to strengthen mutual accountability between national and international partners. Additional financial support (both within mission budgets and voluntary funding as appropriate) will be required to ensure that capacity development strategies are put in place from the outset of a post-conflict effort.***

Predictable international support

51. Being ready to rapidly ramp up a coherent international response in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires predictable technical support in the recurring priority areas outlined above. As part of this response, the United Nations needs ready capacity to ensure that country-level leaders can draw on the knowledge and expertise of diverse United Nations entities. Member States, regional and subregional organizations also have important capacities that are deployed as part of a broader international response. However, a number of steps need to be taken to ensure that international capacities are in place to meet recurring demands in a timely, well-coordinated and complementary manner. Across all priority areas, the United Nations and other international actors face considerable challenges identifying, recruiting and deploying the right individuals who have the requisite technical knowledge as well as applicable experience in post-conflict or difficult settings. Finding this unique combination at short notice is particularly challenging and requires pre-positioning some capacity for immediate deployment and ensuring that we have the ability to put more substantial expertise in place relatively quickly.

Predictable international support: clarity within the United Nations system

52. The United Nations faces severe shortages of expertise and capacity in several of the recurring priority areas outlined above. For some of these areas, this problem is rooted in a lack of institutional clarity as to which entities are responsible for providing United Nations country-level leaders with access to readily available knowledge, expertise and guidance, as well as for investing in rapidly deployable capacity. This limits the predictability of the United Nations response and hampers our ability to move quickly in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Work is already under way in several areas. For example, I have identified designated entities at Headquarters that should provide system-wide service in their respective area of expertise. This responsibility entails serving as a knowledge resource, including for best practices and lessons learned, elaborating standards and guidance in the specific area and providing advice to United Nations entities in the field. It may also require, where possible, establishing deployable human and technical capacities to deliver operational support including, as appropriate, support to the development of national capacities. At the country level, roles and responsibilities will differ as senior leaders designate responsibilities based on in-country presence and capacity as well as host-country Government requests. In each context, field presences should be able to draw on designated expertise and capacities at Headquarters.

53. Progress to date varies considerably and has been linked to the availability of resources. In some cases, a single entity acts as a go-to source of knowledge, expertise and capacity and may host limited rapidly deployable capacities. This is

the case for the Mediation Support Unit and Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs; the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Police Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rapid Response roster.

54. The "cluster approach" is seeking to strengthen the predictability and coherence of humanitarian response by establishing global leads in specific areas: agriculture, camp coordination/management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency telecommunications, health, logistics, nutrition, protection and water, sanitation and hygiene. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights and the environment are also represented by specific technical focal points. This approach encourages United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to invest in building their own response capacities in the area they support, as well as to identify gaps in knowledge and capacity in the sector as a whole and to build capacity with partners at both global and national levels to be able to fill these gaps. This facilitates a more coherent and transparent system with which Governments, donors, and external partners can engage. Capacities and mechanisms put in place during the humanitarian crisis can provide a basis to quickly support the development of national capacities and delivery of basic services in the early post-conflict phase.

55. In operational areas where multiple United Nations actors are involved and diverse technical capacities are required, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law and security sector reform, emphasis has been placed on identifying the specific contribution of each actor, jointly identifying common standards and guidance through dedicated inter-agency frameworks, and establishing arrangements for coordinated delivery in the field. On the basis of lessons learned to date, the challenge we face in these complex areas is to ensure coherence at Headquarters and in the field, avoid gaps where no single entity is responsible, and deliver in those areas where responsibilities are set out.

56. In some of the priority areas, the United Nations currently has relatively limited capacity and looks to external partners to provide additional expertise, knowledge and operational resources. Developing national capacities for public administration, for example, is an area where UNDP is present and active at the national and subnational level, including during the immediate aftermath of conflict, albeit with limited resources. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs has important research and analytical capacity. The World Bank has a critical mass of expertise in the provision of public sector management support at the national level. In some critical areas for immediate post-conflict action, such as public finance and basic monetary and fiscal policy, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively, are the main source of international knowledge, expertise and capacity. There is potential for the United Nations and external partners to increase their collaboration further in order to make full use of their respective strengths.

57. We will continue to work towards greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability across all priority areas identified in the present report. ***In order to strengthen the Secretariat-based institutional arrangements already in place in a number of these areas, I will ensure that they are reviewed at the most senior level on a regular basis. These reviews will assess progress against defined and agreed benchmarks, particularly the extent to which the arrangements have resulted in faster and more effective results on the ground, and determine appropriate follow-up action.***

58. There are a number of recurring priority areas where further clarity and predictability are needed, both within the United Nations system and among key partners. We will work with the relevant United Nations entities and partners, including the World Bank and regional organizations, to improve our collective performance in these areas. Based on in-depth discussions with many of these entities in preparation of the present report, we intend to focus on the following areas where we want to make significant progress in the coming months:

- Public administration, in particular immediate support to key government institutions to enable them to administer and manage core government functions from the outset
- Transitional governance arrangements, including constitutional processes
- The reintegration of returnees
- Early employment generation
- Other aspects of economic revitalization
- The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

59. As we have seen in a number of other recurring priority areas, a core of standing United Nations capacities can be essential to a predictable and effective international response. Based on the upcoming discussions regarding the areas listed above, we may present requests for additional resources for standing capacities or other arrangements that would improve the international response in critical areas. Some of these capacities may have to be funded from the regular or assessed budget. Others may have to come from extrabudgetary resources and should become part of the core funding for the relevant agencies, funds and programmes.

Predictable international support: Fielding United Nations and other international civilian capacities

60. Ensuring a rapid and effective response in countries devastated by conflict requires augmenting the existing capacity on the ground and deploying additional international civilian capacity in areas such as the rapid restoration of agricultural production or effective management of natural resources. While the United Nations is an important source of such capacity or a conduit for it, Member States and regional and subregional organizations also provide important civilian capacity. The challenge is to ensure that these efforts are complementary and are deployed to meet country demand, rather than on the basis of existing supply.

61. The need for rapid deployment should not outweigh careful consideration as to how to draw on capacities that are already on the ground, both national and international. There is almost always international capacity on the ground as conflict ends and, in some cases, humanitarian actors and assets are the only international actors present beyond a national capital. These operational capacities can be critical to support the quick delivery of basic services, particularly as people begin to return. Mechanisms to rapidly reinforce these existing capacities, including through agencies' own surge capacities and rosters, are an essential element of a post-conflict response. In particular, where humanitarian actors are engaged in activities that coincide with immediate peacebuilding priorities, the fastest way to scale up those activities is to augment the capacities and resources of these humanitarian actors.

62. Predictable delivery of international support can only be assured if operational capacities and resources are in place. The precise form of these capacities differs from issue to issue. Where requirements are urgent, and given the significant challenges to rapidly identifying and deploying appropriate civilian expertise, it is most time-efficient to rely on standing and standby civilian capacities maintained by entities across the United Nations system, by international financial institutions, and by external partners.

63. Standing capacities are the most immediate capacities we can draw upon. Within the United Nations, they constitute experienced staff whose conditions of service require that they deploy rapidly to meet urgent operational requirements, and can support urgent capacity development needs until regular recruitment is finalized. These individuals are hired under conditions of service established by their organization and are deployed at critical points to underpin the integrated efforts of the United Nations system on the ground. We have learned that standing capacities can play a critical role in the early planning and start-up phases of a mission, thereby ensuring a seamless transition from the planning to the implementation stages. And using existing capacities can accelerate the delivery of peace dividends. The Mediation Support Unit's Standby Team and the Standing Police Capacity have received high praise for their work in mediation and mission start-up, respectively. ***I recommend that we build on the successful experience with the Standing Police Capacity to ensure, from the outset, a holistic and coordinated approach to strengthening rule of law that results in the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities. I intend to provide further details in this regard, taking into account the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 61/279 and 63/250.*** Other multilateral actors, including the European Union and the World Bank, have established or are developing arrangements for quick deployment of civilian experts, which could complement United Nations standing capacities.

64. Standby capacities include rosters of pre-vetted candidates able and ready to deploy rapidly to serve as staff members of a United Nations mission or under engagement with other United Nations organizations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations or external partners. They also include mediation and other capacities held "on retainer" as well as Member States' capacities ready to be activated rapidly when needed. Rosters of experts are a necessary tool for the rapid deployment of civilian capabilities. However, experience has shown that roster maintenance requires significant investment, particularly to ensure depth, range and diversity of expertise, notably from the Global South. Moreover, expert-level rosters are rarely interoperable or coordinated and there is no single point for national and United Nations actors to transmit requests or obtain information on what resources are available. ***The United Nations Secretariat will work with roster leads to facilitate the development of common standards, training, and guiding principles to enhance the interoperability across expert rosters within each of the typical priority areas.***

65. Rapidly deployable standing and standby capacities complement but do not replace the need for efficient recruitment processes and human resources management. Within the United Nations system, we have a rich resource of personnel with diverse backgrounds, skills, knowledge and experience from many different contexts. However, our own procedures inhibit mobility of staff across the system. We need to be able to draw on this staff much more readily. ***I urge Member***

States to approve the remaining parts of my human resources reform package to harmonize the conditions of service so that through inter-agency mobility with compatible remuneration and benefits packages, the United Nations can utilize and build its community of post-conflict practitioners and occupational experts and foster greater cross-fertilization among the relevant United Nations entities.

66. International support to initial peacebuilding efforts can benefit from the contribution of personnel from neighbouring regions, from countries with a similar socio-economic, cultural or linguistic composition, or from countries that have undergone a post-conflict transition. With its global reach and country presences in the Global South, the United Nations should be able to better leverage such capacities to support peacebuilding efforts. ***I am directing United Nations recruitment efforts to establish new outreach to appropriately qualified personnel from the Global South. I am also directing United Nations field presences to identify qualified national staff for rostering and potential selection for work in post-conflict situations.***

67. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Programme offers valuable support to the provision of civilian capacities in post-conflict environments in a broad range of occupational areas, drawing particularly from neighbouring countries. Built on the principle of volunteerism, the UNV Programme currently deploys individuals in over 140 countries in support of United Nations peace and development activities. ***I encourage UNV, in cooperation with relevant United Nations entities, to prioritize the identification of civilian capacity in the recurring priority areas, and to explore the establishment of a special programme for the deployment of United Nations Volunteers with relevant expertise and experience for short-term field service as peacebuilding volunteers.***

68. Beyond the United Nations, considerable efforts have been made internationally to expand civilian capacities but primarily within a small number of western donor countries. Too often, these efforts have been undertaken with little attention to one another; with inadequate linkages to multilateral systems, through which the bulk of post-conflict response is undertaken; and with insufficient attention to the question of mobilizing capacity in the Global South and among women. ***A review needs to be undertaken that would analyse how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict, focusing particularly on the priority areas identified in the present report. To take this forward, I intend to have further discussions with Member States.*** This review could take stock of the capacities that exist or can be generated within the United Nations, as well as those that exist within regional organizations and Member States, and map these against potential demand. It could look at how we can strengthen and improve interoperability between multilateral institutions, regional organizations and Member State capacities, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacity in the Global South, as well as the potential for developing partnerships.

69. The international community has repeatedly recognized the contribution that civilian experts from the Global South can bring, but investment in building such capacities, to date, has fallen far short. Some valuable steps are being made in Africa, including the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the establishment of the African Civilian Standby Roster for

Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions, and the recent opening of the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. Similar steps have been taken in south-east Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and in the Pacific through the Political and Security Programme of the Pacific Islands Forum. Efforts to build regional crisis management capacity in Africa and other regions need to be further supported and strengthened in order to address civilian expert capacities in a more systematic way.

70. Regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in developing civilian capacities for deployment to post-conflict countries. The United Nations regional economic commissions also have an important role to play in facilitating outreach to qualified individuals and in supporting regional organizations to enhance their crisis management capacities. ***I call upon Member States to invest the necessary resources, as well as to support regional organizations, in their efforts to mobilize civilian experts in countries from the Global South, in particular women.***

Engagement with the World Bank

71. Close collaboration between the United Nations and the World Bank is critical to an effective multilateral response and can provide a platform to support the engagement of other international actors. Recognizing the need for a strong strategic partnership, the President of the World Bank and I signed a Partnership Framework Agreement in October 2008, to strengthen cooperation between our organizations in crisis and post-crisis contexts and thereby contribute to a more effective and sustainable international response. ***Building on this Agreement, the United Nations and the World Bank Group will establish a specific mechanism for regular headquarters-level consultations on crisis and post-crisis countries of common concern. The goal of this consultation mechanism will be to improve the strategic coordination and the collective impact of United Nations and World Bank efforts.***

72. The World Bank has a strong technical capacity in several of the recurring priority areas, which provides an important complement to the United Nations strengths. ***In specific post-conflict situations, the senior United Nations leadership should call upon World Bank country directors and managers for early engagement and rapid technical advice, as appropriate, in priority areas where the Bank has a clear comparative advantage.***

Financing

73. Effective leadership, common strategy, and more predictable support capacity will amount to very little without rapid financial resources. Funding during the humanitarian phase comes in quickly, using special procedures designed for fast release. Funding for peacebuilding is usually drawn from development budgets, which typically have long lead times from inception to disbursement at the country level. The result is a funding gap between the time humanitarian funding starts to diminish and development funding starts to flow. The challenge is to close the gap from both sides, maintaining adequate levels of humanitarian financing in the period immediately after conflict, but also pre-positioning some funding for immediate and catalytic activities, and bringing development funds in earlier. We also need to ensure that mechanisms used to do this are suited to the fluid and volatile nature of early post-conflict environments, and that they enable funds to come in behind a coherent strategy.

74. Immediately after conflict, humanitarian assistance will still be required. In fact, humanitarian needs can sometimes increase as access to affected areas opens and displaced populations begin returning home. During the conflict period, there will be pockets of peace where, in addition to direct "life-saving" interventions, peoples' lives can be greatly improved through transitional safety nets that protect human assets, investments in livelihood opportunities, semi-permanent shelter, road access, and strengthened local governance. These activities are included in the early recovery component of the humanitarian response. They provide important investments in national capacities that help to provide the foundation for a faster response once the conflict ends. **I urge donors to fully fund these important early recovery activities, and continue supporting essential humanitarian assistance in the conflict and post-conflict period.**

75. At the multilateral level, several Funds have been established to pre-position resources for rapid and early disbursement. In addition to its role in the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda, the Peacebuilding Fund could be used in two ways to catalyse early priorities and to bridge the funding gap between donor pledges and funding disbursements. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, a first quick release of funds could be requested by the senior United Nations official in the country, working closely with national authorities, to catalyse concrete activities identified in an early integrated strategic framework, or its equivalent. A second more significant allotment could be made available once a national peace consolidation and recovery framework has been established, to catalyse the urgent activities identified therein and help to bridge delays in donor disbursements. ***I have suggested in my report on the Peacebuilding Fund to the General Assembly (A/63/818) that the terms of reference for the Fund should be revised to accommodate both a flexible and early release of funds for critical peacebuilding needs and a second catalytic release as other resources are mobilized. I will take steps to strengthen the catalytic focus of the Peacebuilding Fund on core peacebuilding priorities and ensure the right timing and focus of Peacebuilding Fund funding.***

76. Several other fast-disbursing mechanisms, such as the World Bank State- and Peace-Building Fund, the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund, and the European Commission Instrument for Stability have been designed to support peacebuilding activities while more comprehensive funding becomes available. The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation funding instrument was also specifically introduced and designed to address the transition funding gap. Complementarity between these instruments and the Peacebuilding Fund is essential to ensure that the Fund can fulfil its catalytic function.

77. The Peacebuilding Fund and other fast-disbursing pre-positioned funds will not be sufficient to close the gap. Additional country-specific funds need to come in earlier to support peacebuilding priorities in the first days and months. But, existing funding mechanisms are not suited to early post-conflict situations, which require a considerable degree of speed, flexibility and risk tolerance. I look forward to an early outcome from the ongoing efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee to revise donor procedures so as to allow earlier and faster release of funds in post-conflict situations with a higher tolerance of risk. Transparency in international assistance is also essential to foster confidence in the peace process and enable greater accountability to beneficiaries and national stakeholders. ***I urge donors to be bold***

and innovative in finding solutions that will establish flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict. Funding should be adequate and commensurate with pledges made, and should be made available in a timely manner to close funding gaps, including for early recovery, and avoid duplication. Funding should also be aligned behind the limited set of priorities identified through common assessment and planning processes to ensure that financial incentives drive all actors in the same direction. Given the persistence of this issue, it is time that Member States take the necessary action to address the shortcomings in funding practices that they have identified. ***I will ask the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, working closely with the Peacebuilding Support Office, to engage in this process and to ensure that the United Nations and other key multilateral partners provide the necessary support to bring this discussion to a rapid and satisfactory conclusion.***

78. The early establishment of country-level multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms can reduce the risk for each individual donor while increasing the predictability of funding for national authorities. Evidence has shown that when resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds towards a focused set of agreed priorities. If well-supported, multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic approach. In the past, such funds were plagued by administrative and legal obstacles that diminished their effectiveness considerably. Within the United Nations-World Bank Partnership framework agreement, we have addressed the management of multi-donor trust funds to reduce the obstacles inhibiting their fast and smooth operation. ***In addition to calling upon donors to fully fund ongoing operations through existing mechanisms, I will encourage the establishment of in-country multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms in countries emerging from conflict, as appropriate. I encourage donors to make use of these mechanisms to the fullest possible extent.***

79. Funding for women's early recovery needs is vital to increase women's empowerment and correct historical gender imbalances, as well as the deficit in funding for women's and girls' needs. Neglect of women's needs for physical security, income control and access to decision-making can impose serious costs. ***Early funds for women's organizations and networks can empower female voices in the evolving peace process. I will ensure that United Nations-managed funds and in particular the United Nations Development Group Multi-Donor Trust Funds will pilot a system pioneered by UNDP to allow decision-makers to track gender-related allocations.***

VI. Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

80. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in late 2005, through Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180, represented a major milestone in the evolution of the international community's response to peacebuilding. The Commission combines a close link to three principal organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council) with a unique membership that brings together not only seven members of each of these organs, but also the top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions, and of military personnel and civilian police to United

Nations missions. In the presidential statement of 20 May 2008 by which the Security Council requested the present report, the Council welcomed the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in advising on the coordination of international peacebuilding activities and resources, and expressed its support for enhancing the role of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund.

81. In the less than four years of its existence, the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission with the countries on its agenda has continued to evolve. While it is still early to draw conclusions from the limited country engagement, Sierra Leone and Burundi offer useful lessons that can be applied in other countries. At the same time, Peacebuilding Commission deliberations have identified a need to further adapt its mechanisms and working methods to strengthen its contributions to the overall peacebuilding effort.

82. The Peacebuilding Commission has a critical role to play in championing and promoting the agenda outlined in the present report. After the main conflict in a country ends, many of the critical peacebuilding tasks have to be initiated. This also means that the role of the Peacebuilding Commission extends to the critical period immediately after conflict covered by the report. Several of the main purposes of the Commission, as defined in paragraph 2 of its founding resolutions, are highly relevant during this period. As the founding resolutions also underline, the main purpose of the Commission in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council (in particular where there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operation on the ground) is to provide advice to the Council at its request. ***The Security Council should consider more proactively how the advice of the Commission could contribute to its work during the early phase of the Council's consideration of post-conflict situations, for example, by providing an integrated peacebuilding perspective and specific suggestions for the Council's own engagement with the country on its agenda.*** For countries on the Security Council's agenda, the respective roles of the Council and the Commission need to be seen as complementary and in parallel, as envisaged by the founding resolutions, rather than sequenced in a manner that would diminish the Commission's role during earlier phases where it could add significant value.

83. ***The Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to consider how it could further enhance its advisory role in relation to countries on its agenda and a number of areas covered in the present report, such as:***

(a) ***Focusing and sustaining attention to specific peacebuilding priorities;***

(b) ***Encouraging relevant actors to channel appropriate and timely human and financial resources for developing national capacities and institutions in critical priority areas;***

(c) ***Monitoring progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies and recovery frameworks developed through common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors, and providing political support as necessary;***

(d) ***Promoting greater coherence and synergies between the different parts of the United Nations system and other relevant actors outside the United Nations system.***

84. ***Building on ongoing discussions in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on financing for development, the Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to work with these two organs to encourage discussion of aid effectiveness and mutual accountability with a specific emphasis on the funding challenges that arise as conflict ends. More specifically, the Commission could:***

(a) ***Promote innovative approaches to mobilizing resources for peacebuilding, especially for countries that receive inadequate attention and funding;***

(b) ***Advance aid effectiveness and mutual accountability between donors and programme countries around national peacebuilding compacts and priorities;***

(c) ***Encourage donors to provide faster, more flexible and more risk-tolerant funding to address the specific funding challenges and gaps that arise when conflict ends.***

85. I also look forward in 2010 to the review of arrangements set out in the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In preparation for this review, I welcome the efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission, with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office, to assess its current working methods and tools and propose more innovative and flexible approaches to how it can best engage and provide advice in post-conflict situations. This could range from more in-depth engagement, as has been the case so far, to lighter and more focused attention to specific priority issues where the Commission can add value in ways that other mechanisms cannot. In all cases, the Commission should build on and enhance existing country-level strategy-setting processes where they exist, and ensure that its work is closely linked to and driven by the specific needs and priorities of the country on its agenda. The unique membership and flexible configurations of the Commission should be considered as important factors in these deliberations as well.

86. More generally, I anticipate that the review in 2010 will provide Member States, particularly the members of the Commission, with an opportunity to deepen their own engagement with the Commission and to take greater ownership of its agenda and the advice it provides. The Commission can only succeed if all of its members come together to maximize its potential. They can ensure that the Commission plays a key role in supporting countries to achieve sustainable peace and development, and ultimately move beyond the stage where some of them require large peacekeeping missions. As the present report has made clear, however, this engagement needs to start early and it has to be focused on the key priorities that will ultimately allow for this transition to occur.

VII. Conclusions and observations

87. The challenges addressed in the present report are not new. For over a decade we have been grappling with how to bring peacebuilding upstream and mount a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. However, at this time of global resource constraints, when the most vulnerable bear the brunt of economic downturn, there is a new urgency to redouble our efforts and ensure that resources are used more efficiently by promoting a more coherent, effective and focused response.

88. In the present report, I have focused on the first two years after conflict because this period presents particular challenges and persistent gaps, but also considerable opportunities. By meeting people's demands for security, shoring up the political process, delivering a peace dividend and strengthening national capacity, we can help national actors in their efforts to set positive dynamics in motion right from the start. I must underscore the importance of an early emphasis on strengthening national capacity, ensuring it is part of an entry strategy, and not merely as the basis for exit.

89. Given the imperative of national ownership and the fluidity of post-conflict contexts, peacebuilding efforts must be anchored at the country level. While the support and guidance from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations Headquarters and Member State capitals is essential, it is largely the leaders on the ground, both national and international, who can ensure that vision, strategy and decision-making respond effectively to the realities of an ever-changing situation.

90. The United Nations is increasingly expected to play a leadership role in the field, facilitating engagement between national and international actors, and among international actors. I have set out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations contribution to a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The elements of this agenda include, strengthening and supporting leadership teams in the field, promoting earlier strategic coherence, strengthening national capacity from the outset, improving our ability to provide rapid and predictable capacities, and enhancing the speed, flexibility, amount and risk tolerance of post-conflict financing. Each element reinforces the others. To be successful, we need to implement the full agenda.

91. The United Nations will always be one among many actors involved in efforts to support countries emerging from war and therefore relies on strong partnerships based on clear comparative advantage. The World Bank is a critical strategic partner in the initial post-conflict period. I am committed to deepening our relationship and ensuring that it can be operationalized to leverage our respective strengths. Regional and subregional organizations also have vital political, security and economic roles to play in the immediate aftermath of conflict. We must build on our nascent partnerships in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and development spheres to promote the engagement of regional and subregional organizations in peacebuilding.

92. Implementing this agenda would be a critical step forward in improving international support for countries emerging from conflict. This agenda represents the beginning rather than the end of a process. I am eager to take these steps forward within the United Nations system. I look to Member States as key partners without whose support this agenda cannot be realized.

93. The successful implementation of this agenda requires that certain fundamental political conditions are in place. A basic level of political will and commitment on the part of national actors is a precondition for peacebuilding. A regional environment conducive to transforming conflict dynamics into peaceful political and economic conditions is essential. International support is also fundamental and requires that Member States align their assistance and engagement in support of a coherent and sustained effort. Unless these basic political conditions are in place, the ability of the Organization to promote a coherent and effective response will be limited.

94. There are no quick fixes for holding and sustaining peace. National actors face enormous political, security and development challenges after conflict. But if the international community, led by the United Nations system, is ready to respond rapidly, coherently and effectively, we can help to give national actors a greater chance of sustaining peace and laying the foundations for sustainable development. All too often it is innocent men, women and children who pay the price of war. We cannot ask them to pay the price of peace.